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This paper analyzes whether nation-state governments can increase their credibility by 
becoming members of international organizations. Credibility is an important asset 
because it determines the real interest rate and is expected to have an important impact 
on investment and growth. It is hypothesized that the degree of delegation to 
international organizations can improve the credibility of nation-state governments. 
This hypothesis is tested by introducing three new indicators for international 
delegation. On the basis of panel data for up to 136 countries and the time period from 
1984 to 2004, membership in international organizations is significantly and robustly 
linked with better credibility, here proxied for by country risk ratings. Two more results 
stand out: the longer a country has had a high level of membership, the higher its 
credibility, ceteris paribus; and: the credibility-enhancing effect is strongest in countries 
whose domestic institutions are weak. 
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1 Introduction 
Membership in international organizations is often considered to have beneficial 
consequences for their member countries – as well as for the international community 
at large. The WTO is supposed to enhance international trade, the IMF is supposed to 
stabilize the international financial system, the UN are supposed to increase security 
and peace to name but a few possible examples. But what do we really know about the 
consequences of being a member in international organizations? Rose (2004) is unable 
to show that GATT/WTO membership has increased international trade. However, 
there is evidence that membership in international organizations bears direct benefits 
for these members: Temporary members of the UN Security Council, e.g., receive 
larger loans from the US, as well as more programs and projects from the IMF and the 
World Bank (Kuziemko and Werker 2006, Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2006, 2007). 
Countries serving on the Board of Executive Directors at the World Bank receive 
substantially larger credits than other countries (Kaja and Werker 2007). In this paper, 
we are interested in a slightly different question, namely whether membership in 
International Organizations (IOs) increases the credibility of member countries – and 
thus confers privileges onto their members. 
It has often been pointed out that it can be a disadvantage to be too strong (e.g. 
Weingast 1993). A state that is strong enough to protect private property rights and to 
enforce private contracts is also strong enough to expropriate private wealth. This could 
be called the dilemma of the strong state. Rational subjects know this and will therefore 
invest less than they would if they could be sure that the state will not misuse its 
strength. States that have not had the chance to build up a reputation as meticulously 
sticking to their own promises will be especially affected. In such cases, the creation of 
domestic independent agencies will often not be a credible commitment because such 
agencies can be abolished with relative ease. It might therefore be rational for these 
countries to delegate relatively more powers internationally. Majone (1996, 12) has 
even argued that “credibility, rather than the legitimate use of coercion is now the most 
valuable resource of policy-makers.” We test whether policy-makers can “buy” 
credibility by delegating powers internationally – or whether they will have to “make” 
it on the nation-state level. 
Levy and Spiller (1994, 210) have dealt with the issue of regulatory commitment and 
have hypothesized that countries that do not have an independent judiciary will have 
difficulties to develop regulatory systems which attract substantial levels of private 
investment. In such cases, “alternative mechanisms of securing commitment (like 
international guarantees) will be necessary (ibid.).” Increasing one’s credibility via 
international delegation appears a plausible idea. Yet, we know very little about the   3
economic effects of such delegation.1 This paper aims at providing some preliminary 
answers to the question whether international delegation of competences increases 
government credibility. 
We construct three different indicators to measure the degree of international 
delegation that a government has committed to. On the basis of up to 136 countries, all 
three indicators are significant for explaining the observed variation in the countries’ 
risk ratings that are used as a proxy for credibility here. This is the case even after 
controlling for other variables such as openness, government consumption, GDP 
growth or the debt-to-export ratio. For countries whose domestic institutions are weak, 
membership in international organizations has particularly important effects. 
Membership in the GATT/WTO, membership in the International Center for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and ratification of the Optional Protocol 
are particularly conducive to boost credibility. 
In this paper, the delegation decisions of governments are taken as exogenously given.2 
We are thus not interested in explaining delegation decisions but in the consequences of 
delegation decisions. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next 
section contains a number of arguments in favor of the presupposition that the 
international delegation of powers could have credibility-enhancing effects. Section 
three proposes a number of ways to make international delegation measurable – and 
thus comparable. In section four, our estimation approach is presented and section five 
presents the central results. Section six contains a number of robustness tests and 
section seven concludes. 
2 Why Should International Delegation Enhance Credibility? 
2.1 Some Theory 
Credibility can be an important asset of a government. If a government that promises to 
enforce private property rights is credible, then actors will invest more than if the 
government was not credible. Higher investment levels translate into additional income. 
This, in turn, leads to higher utility levels for both the governed and the governing 
because higher (aggregate) income also means increased tax revenue. The credibility of 
                                                 
1 As notable exceptions, Marchesi and Thomas (1999) and Marchesi and Sabani (2007) analyze 
“delegated monitoring” to the International Monetary Fund. 
2 The decision whether to delegate domestically or internationally has been analyzed by Voigt and 
Salzberger (2002); Tallberg (2002) deals with the decision to delegate to a supranational organization, 
namely the EU. For an excellent treatment of delegation in international organizations see Hawkins et al. 
(2006). See also Frey (2008).   4
a government can thus make everybody better off. Additionally, income growth will 
often make governments more popular. 
The separation of powers has often been discussed as a way to increase government 
credibility (Landes and Posner 1975, Barzel 1997, Tsebelis 2002). Beyond the 
conventional separation into the three functions of legislating, executing and 
adjudicating, the delegation to independent or non-majoritarian institutions has received 
a lot of attention lately (see, e.g., Majone 2001 or Voigt and Salzberger 2002). 
Independent central banks are the most frequently cited example: in the long run, 
everybody profits from stable money. In the short run, politicians can, however, 
increase their popularity by increasing monetary supply. If citizens expect this, the 
short-term positive effects will not materialize but the policy will nevertheless be costly 
because it will lead to a higher inflation rate. Delegating monetary authority to an 
independent central bank can be interpreted as a solution to the problem of time-
inconsistent preferences as introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1977). This problem is 
not unique to monetary policy but can be identified with regard to a variety of 
government policies including, e.g., environmental and competition policy. 
Correspondingly, many states have introduced independent agencies that are 
responsible for policies in these areas. 
It would thus seem that rational nation state governments should aim at increasing their 
credibility by delegating some competence to independent agencies. Yet, creating such 
agencies and respecting their independence are not identical. Decision-makers who are 
subject to time-inconsistent preferences and who have delegated decision-making 
power might be tempted to interfere with the decisions of their agents once a certain 
decision has to be made. Worse yet, unsatisfied delegators might simply get rid off their 
delegatees or even abolish the independent agency altogether. This problem has been 
coined “second order commitment problem” (Moser 1999). On a worldwide scale, the 
effective average term-length of both supreme court judges and central bank governors 
is substantially below the term-length to be expected according to the statutes of those 
agencies.3 Formal delegation is thus not sufficient to solve the problem of time 
inconsistency. Hence the question is whether other institutional arrangements – like the 
delegation of competence to IOs – are more likely to make government promises 
credible. It would seem that IO membership can serve as a substitute to a strong 
domestic reputation especially for those countries that have not been able to build up a 
                                                 
3 The effective average term-length of the members of the Supreme Court of Paraguay between 1960 and 
1990 has, e.g., been a mere 1.1 years (Henisz 2000). Many states have judiciaries that are formally quite 
independent. But de facto judicial independence is only loosely correlated with de jure independence (the 
correlation coefficient between the two being 0.22; see Feld and Voigt 2003).    5
reputation of making promises and subsequently living up to them. This would imply 
that the credibility-enhancing effect of IO-membership should be especially strong 
where domestic institutions are weak. If, on the other hand, IO-membership only 
complements good domestic institutions, the credibility-enhancing effect should be 
strong under good domestic institutions. 
Actors with time-inconsistent preferences will make decisions that are not in their own 
long-term interest. They thus have an interest in restructuring the relevant decision-
making situations. Rational actors with time-inconsistent preferences will try to 
transform simple promises (e.g., to enforce private property rights) into credible 
commitments by modifying the relevant payoffs. If, once the time has come to honor or 
break one’s promises, honoring one’s promises leads to higher utility than breaking 
them and this is common knowledge among the participating actors, a simple promise 
has been transformed into a credible commitment. 
One can think of the relevant interactions as a simple non-iterated game: in the first 
stage, government announces its policies (it could, e.g., announce to create private 
property rights and promise to enforce them), in the second stage, private actors make 
their investment decisions based on the credibility of government promises and in the 
third stage, government decides whether to honor its promises (enforce private property 
rights) or whether to break them (attenuate private property rights). After government 
has made its choice, the private actors can decide whether to take the case to court 
(stage four). If the court decides that government action was in congruence with its 
promises, the game is over. If the court, however, decides that government had broken 
its promises and that it was its duty to make up for it, the next stage follows in which 
government either accepts the court decision (i.e. makes up for the damage it has 
caused) or ignores the court decision.   6
Figure 1: A Stylized Game 
G = Government; P = Private actors; C = Court 
 
The government will ignore the court decision if that is connected with a higher utility 
level than implementing it. Continuing to solve the game backwardly leads to the 
prediction that private actors will choose a low level of voluntary investment if 
government is expected to ignore the court decision.4 
Repetition of the game greatly increases the number of possible equilibria. 
Governments might – but need not – honor their own promises because they know that 
what they do in this round of the game affects private actors’ decisions in the next 
round. Whether repetition makes governments comply depends inter alia on their time 
preferences. 
The question thus is whether delegation of competence to IOs changes the payoffs in 
such a way that the government cannot make itself better off by breaking its own 
promises. We are thus interested in a comparative institutional analysis which compares 
domestic with international commitment capacities. In order to compare the two 
institutional alternatives, a look at a stylized game that could be played on the 
international level is necessary. Comparison of the payoffs will contain some 
information on likely equilibria. 
The game tree of a game involving international delegation is quite similar to the one 
just discussed. In the international game the first stage does not simply consist of 
announcing a policy but announcing a policy by joining an international organization. 
                                                 
4 If all actors are rational and this is common knowledge, it is hard to explain why government would 
promise to enforce private property rights in the first place. 
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If the respective IO has a court, stages four and five are exactly identical with those of 
the domestic game, if it does not, the decision whether a memberstate has played by the 
rules of the organization (has honored its promises) can be taken by some other actor 
(such as a general assembly). Just as in the domestic game, here too, governments have 
the option not to implement the decision made by the IO. If that was the last stage of 
the game, the likelihood of government implementing the (court) decision would prima 
facie not seem substantially higher than in the game played domestically. Yet, it can be 
argued that the international game consists of one more stage in which the other 
member states of the IO decide whether and how to sanction a government that ignores 
the decision made in stage five of the game. Possible sanctions include the freezing of 
financial aid, the refusal to make further concessions on trade issues, an economic 
embargo and – as ultima ratio – even the threat to go to war. Given a sufficiently high 
probability of being subject to sanctions, implementing the (court) decision might well 
prove to have a higher payoff than ignoring it. 
It could be argued that the domestic game also entails a seventh stage, in which the 
voters or the public could sanction government by, e.g., refusing to re-elect it, 
criticizing it in the press etc. One would then have to compare the expected value of the 
domestic sanction with that of the international sanction. If the expected value of the 
international sanction (but not that of the domestic one) leads the government to choose 
the implement-the-court-decision strategy, the international delegation of competence 
can be expected to have a credibility-enhancing effect. Assuming that governments 
might still be sanctioned domestically after having joined an IO, the relevant expected 
value is the sum of the cost of the international plus the domestic sanction.5 
It might be worthwhile pointing out some of the possible implications of the two games 
just described with regard to their capacity to enable governments to make credible 
commitments. 
                                                 
5 On theoretical grounds, the relationship between the number and kinds of domestic constraints and 
delegation of competence to IOs is not entirely clear: on the one hand, it can be argued that international 
delegation will only confer higher credibility to governments if domestic constraints are not sufficiently 
credible; this would, hence, mean that they are substitutes. On the other hand, it can be argued that some 
domestic constraints are a necessary precondition for international delegation to have any beneficial 
effects, which would mean that they are complements. 
  Ex ante, it seems plausible to assume that a country that has consistently honored its own promises 
over a number of periods will be able to enjoy a high degree of credibility even though it is not a member 
of (m)any international organizations. This will, however, take a number of years and the hypothesis of 
this paper is that high degrees of credibility might be achieved faster if the country joins a number of IOs. 
This means that the periods directly following membership should display substantial increases in 
credibility; these additional credibility gains are expected to become smaller over time until the growth 
path converges to the “steady state” level of credibility.   8
The first stage of both the domestic as well as the international game consists of 
announcing a policy. It seems reasonable to assume that policy announcements on the 
international level are much more stable than on the domestic level in the sense that 
changes in these announcements cannot be made unilaterally on the international level. 
Joining an existing IO can be interpreted as joining a given policy announcement. 
Given that the policy announcement is conducive to securing private property rights, 
joining an IO can entail higher credibility gains because the announced policies cannot 
be changed easily. 
Let us now deal with the iterated version of the game: Suppose an IO has the reputation 
for implementing private property rights; membership is hence valuable and non-
members are interested in joining – possibly even without appropriately modifying 
their own policies. A deterioration of the IOs’ reputation would be the consequence. 
But the reputation can be up-held if incumbents are aware of that danger and specify 
the conditions under which newcomers may join in a way that secures their playing by 
the rules. The example of China having to modify a substantial number of domestic 
structures before being admitted to the WTO proves that this is more than a mere 
theoretical possibility. Carefully selecting club members is one way of keeping up the 
reputation of the club, but is, as such, not sufficient as countries who were admitted 
might decide not to play by the rules once they are members. 
Before turning to formal sanctions and the issue of their reliable provision, let us 
shortly deal with the possibilities of “informal sanctions” that a government not 
implementing a (court) decision might be subject to. Investment decisions are decisions 
under uncertainty. Potential investors search for reliable information regarding the 
behavior of the government of the country in which they might invest. If the court – or 
the international body – making the decision on the compatibility of the government’s 
actions with its announced policies is perceived to be impartial, its decisions might very 
well influence investment decisions although court decisions are not factually enforced. 
If one thinks of the game as an iterated one and assumes that potential investors rely on 
past government behavior to predict future behavior, a court decision against a 
government might deter potential investors from factually investing. This can be true in 
both the domestic and the international versions of the game. 
Remember that we are interested in identifying mechanisms which make governments 
comply with their policy announcements when playing an international game but not 
(or to a lower degree) when playing the game domestically. It is interesting to compare 
the possible effects of public opinion of the game played domestically with the one 
played internationally. Suppose public opinion is critical of a government not honoring 
its promises no matter whether the game is played domestically or internationally.   9
Further suppose that one’s country’s international reputation is an independent 
argument in the utility function of many citizens. It then follows that public opinion 
reacts more fiercely in the internationally embedded game. Whether the differential 
impact is sufficient to provoke a change in the dominant strategy of government is, of 
course, the decisive question. 
We now turn to formal sanctions. Here, stages seven and four are crucial. Assuming 
that bringing suit is costly, one has to ask for the incentives to do so. If private actors 
expect the government to ignore court decisions, incentives to bring suit are very low. 
If state actors – in the international version of the game – cannot expect to be better off 
as a consequence of bringing suit, the corresponding incentives to bring suit would 
appear to be similarly low. One incentive for nation-state governments to bring suit 
could be their desire not to appear weak after others have reneged upon them.6 
Sanctioning rule breakers is usually costly, the provision of sanctions thus amounts to 
the production of a public good and its provision can therefore not be taken for granted. 
The delegation of competence to IOs will be interpreted as a credible commitment to 
play by the rules of the organization only if rule-breaking behavior is sanctioned with 
high probability. The track-record of the IOs in sanctioning rule breakers is an 
important indicator in this regard: bailing out countries or prolonging credits although 
conditionality requirements have not been fulfilled reduces the value of membership in 
such an organization in terms of credibility gains for the respective country because 
rule-breaking behavior is not costly.7 It can thus not serve to increase a country’s 
credibility. Given that the threat of IOs in sanctioning non-complying governments is 
sufficiently credible, governments will prefer to implement court decisions. This, in 
turn, will induce more actors to bring suit in the fourth stage of the game as they can 
expect that a favorable court decision will indeed make them better off. 
Having to suffer substantial losses in utility after having broken a rule cannot only 
increase the likelihood of governments honoring their promises but also their desire to 
exit from an IO. High costs of sanctions can thus only be expected to increase 
credibility if exit is sufficiently costly. If the international delegation of powers can be 
reversed at low or even zero cost, delegation cannot be expected to increase credibility. 
Only if a government has to incur substantial costs if it tries to “renationalize” a policy 
                                                 
6 As long as no actors have ever brought suit, government cannot have ignored a court decision. 
Backward induction can, hence, not be used to argue that incentives for bringing suit were low. This 
means that we can assume that at least one suit will be brought against the government if it reneges upon 
its promises. This can have the informal effects just discussed even if the government does not abide by 
the court decision. 
7 See Marchesi and Sabani (2007) for a detailed discussion regarding compliance with program 
conditions of the International Monetary Fund. See also Vreeland (2006, 2007).   10
competence can the delegation decision be expected to be interpreted as a credible 
commitment and hence to increase government credibility.8 
To sum up: some theoretical possibilities for why the commitment capacity of 
governments could be enhanced by delegating some of their powers internationally 
have been described. In a nutshell, the idea is that by voluntarily tying their hands, 
governments can make themselves better off. Conventional wisdom has it, though, that 
IOs are hugely inefficient and ineffective organizations.9 The question thus is whether 
one can show empirically that some of the theoretically possible effects do play a role; 
that membership in IOs does indeed improve governments’ capacity to credibly commit 
themselves – and that membership hence does indeed have its privileges. In order to do 
so, the possible transmission channels will be spelled out in the next sub-section, 
followed by some considerations how they can be put to an empirical test in section 3. 
2.2 Possible Transmission Mechanisms 
If delegation of competence to IOs enhances the commitment capacity of nation-state 
governments, then countries that are members in the respective IOs should enjoy higher 
credibility than non-members, ceteris paribus. This should be reflected in a number of 
objective variables such as interest rates and (foreign direct) investment but also in 
more subjective variables such as country risk and creditworthiness rankings as well as 
security of property rights evaluations (Figure 2). 
                                                 
8 A discussant of the paper (Mary Shirley) pointed out that this approach towards credible commitment 
could also be modeled as a signaling game in which the costliness of the signal (membership in IOs) is 
crucial for its effect (here on the credibility). More broadly, it can be argued that the value of the signal of 
becoming a member of one (or more) IOs depends on (1) the reputation of the IO, (2) the cost of entry 
into the IO, (3) the costs of the sanctions in case of non-compliance with the rules of the IO, (4) the cost 
of exit from the IO. All four components should positively contribute to the value of the signal. In this 
paper, these four components are not dealt with in any detail. In a companion paper (Voigt 2006), the 
domestic costs of both joining and exiting from IOs have been ascertained by asking how many domestic 
players had to consent to either action with what majorities. It turns out that the more difficult it is to 
delegate competence internationally in the first place, the higher the ensuing credibility. 
9 According to Vaubel, Dreher and Soylu (2007), inefficiency in international organizations can partly be 
attributed to principal-agent problems. They show that staff size of international organizations depends 
negatively on (an interaction with) the financing share of the largest contributor (his incentive to 
monitor). For an excellent overview of principal-agent problems in international organizations see 
Vaubel (2006) and Hawkins et al. (2006).   11
Figure 2: Potential transmission mechanisms 
The security of property rights should be positively correlated with high levels of total 
factor productivity. All of these positive effects should lead to increased rates of 
economic growth and, over time, to higher levels of income. 
The two dotted lines indicate two possible endogeneity problems. First, it could be the 
case that countries with high incomes have fewer difficulties of joining IOs than 
countries with low incomes. Secondly, it could be the case that countries that enjoy 
higher credibility levels have fewer difficulties of joining IOs than countries with bad 
country risk ratings. Possibilities to control for these potential endogeneity problems 
will be discussed below. 
This section has presented the basic economic rationale for delegating powers 
internationally. Some possible cost components that can result from not following the 
rules of the international game have been mentioned, many of them, however, are very 
difficult to quantify. We therefore now turn to search for proxies that allow us to assess 
the effects of the international delegation of competence on credibility empirically. 
3 Making International Delegation Measurable 
In order to analyze whether and to what extent the international delegation of 
competences can increase a country’s credibility, one needs to devise tests with which 
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possible tests but also to highlight some of the conceptual problems in devising such 
tests. Prima facie, it would seem straightforward to assume that the higher a country’s 
overall degree of integration into the international community, the more credible its 
promises should be. A general indicator measuring some “integration degree” could 
consist of counting the number of inter-governmental IOs that a country is member of 
in a particular year and to compare them with the membership numbers of other 
countries. This is indeed our first indicator of international delegation, taken from 
Dreher, Gaston and Martens (2008).  
This is, of course, a very crude indicator with definite disadvantages. It has been noted 
that the number of IOs has been steadily rising since World War II (Union of 
International Associations 2006). The rising number of IOs as such is, however, not 
equivalent with an increase in the delegation of powers. Ideally, one would thus not 
count the number of memberships but the degree to which powers have been delegated 
onto the international level. Further, some countries appear to be “more integrated” 
simply because they are geographically located in world areas that have more regional 
IOs. This indicator thus contains serious bias. Furthermore, no distinction whatsoever is 
made between the substantive areas in which IOs are active, i.e., IOs like the 
international financial institutions or the WTO are counted just as heavily as IOs that 
have nothing to do with property rights or are even inimical to their protection. 
Different degrees of membership, which might indicate different degrees of 
“earnestness” in membership are not taken explicitly into account in this approach 
either: whether a state has ratified additional conventions within the realm of an IO 
could be valuable information that is not used with this very simple indicator. 
We therefore developed a second indicator 
•  which is confined to IOs that are active on a global scale, 
•  which is confined to IOs that put some weight on the protection of property rights 
and possibly endow individuals with standing before international dispute 
settlement mechanisms and 
•  that takes “degrees of membership” explicitly into account. Ratified conventions 
within these IOs that promise to be either particularly relevant for the protection 
of private property rights or to indicate a high degree of earnestness, e.g., because 
membership implies monitoring by international groups, sanctions are severe etc. 
are explicitly recognized. 
This leads to an “unweighted” indicator. We further developed a weighted version of 
this indicator that does not simply count whether a country is member of our subset of 
IOs or not but that counts the number of years it has already been a member. This 
“weighted indicator” thus takes into account explicitly the possibility that the length of   13
membership could have an effect on the degree of credibility it conveys.10 Thus, the 
unweighted indicator simply adds up the number of “qualifying” organizations which a 
nation-state is member of. The weighted indicator, in turn, weighs membership with the 
number of years that a country has been a member.11 
Membership in the following IOs and – more specifically – in the following 
conventions has been taken into account in the construction of the two indicators: 
(1)  Membership in the GATT/WTO, which reduces the discretionary leeway of 
governments with regard to trade policy.  
(2/3) Membership in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD): Membership in the IBRD has become almost universal which means that 
little variation results and membership does not convey a valuable signal 
anymore. This has led us to look at membership of two sub-organizations, namely 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the International Center for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). A dummy for membership in the IFC 
is included because its aim is to promote private enterprise by improving the 
investment climate. If it is effective, membership should thus improve members’ 
credibility. 
Membership in ICSID gives private investors who believe that a member-state to 
ICSID has not complied with its contractual obligations the possibility of a trial 
against that state. Members thus explicitly choose to have their behavior 
monitored by third parties. Once the parties have consented to arbitration under 
ICSID, neither party can unilaterally withdraw. Arbitration under ICSID amounts 
to a far-reaching delegation of competence since all contracting states to ICSID 
are required by the Convention to enforce ICSID arbitral awards. This is called 
res iudicata effect by legal scholars. The role of ICSID has become ever more 
important over time: advance consent by governments to submit investment 
disputes to its arbitration can be found in some 20 investment laws and in more 
than 900 bilateral investment treaties as well as in four multilateral trade and 
investment treaties (inter alia NAFTA). It is, hence, not surprising that the 
number of cases submitted to ICSID has markedly increased in recent years. This 
remains the case even if the filings connected to Argentina’s recent crisis are not 
taken into consideration (ICSID webpage). 
                                                 
10  Remember that the credit cards of the organization that claims that membership had its privileges 
also contain the information “member since x” suggesting that longer membership translates into higher 
credibility. 
11 Reynaud and Vauday (2007) use a similar weighting methodology to build an index of Non-
Proliferation Treaties to capture countries’ geopolitical weight.   14
(4-7) Membership in the UN is even more universal than membership in the IBRD. But 
ratification of the International Convention for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
as well as ratification of the International Convention for Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) are not as widespread. Whereas the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights does not have a legally binding character, these two 
conventions are endowed with a supervisory committee that monitors 
implementation. The ICCPR guarantees basic individual rights, some of which 
can be interpreted as a precondition for secure property rights (such as freedom 
from torture and slavery and the right to personal freedom and security). Other 
individual rights can be interpreted as important aspects of the realization of the 
rule of law (like the right to a fair trial or the prohibition of ex post facto laws 
etc.). The guarantees contained in the ICESCR are a lot more controversial with 
regard to their effect on the protection of private property rights.12 It could even 
be argued that some of them are inimical to the protection of private property 
rights. We have decided to take both covenants into account also in order to be 
able to compare the two effects on credibility.13 
Variation can be further increased by counting the states that have agreed to the 
so-called Optional Protocol (to the ICCPR) in which they promise to abolish 
capital punishment. Ratification of this optional protocol is not directly related to 
property rights issues but can be interpreted as a signal of a government’s 
earnestness to implement the rules it has agreed to under the ICCPR. Further, it is 
taken into account whether a government has ratified the “Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards” – often also called the 
New York Convention. This convention specifies the conditions under which 
states promise to recognize and enforce arbitration awards that are not issued by 
state courts but by non-state courts. 
Contracting parties often prefer arbitration courts over state courts because their 
decisions take the specific problems of the conflicting parties better into account 
than state courts, and decision-making takes less time than in state courts. Since 
they are voluntarily chosen by the contracting parties, the choice of private 
arbitration courts reveals the contracting parties’ preferences. If contracting 
parties did not believe that their property rights were sufficiently protected in 
these courts, they would not choose them. It can hence be inferred that 
governments that announce that they will enforce foreign arbitration awards give 
                                                 
12  The Covenant contains, e.g., the right to work, the right to social security, the right to an adequate 
standard of living as well as the right to “the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” 
13  Distinguishing between four kinds of basic rights, namely basic human rights, property rights, civil 
rights, and social and emancipatory rights, Blume and Voigt (2007) find in a study of 137 countries that 
none of them is inimical to economic growth.   15
up some of their sovereignty in favor of a better protection of private property 
rights. 
(8)  The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the dispute settlement branch of the 
UN. UN-Members do not, however, have to accept its jurisdiction qua 
membership but can opt in to do so voluntarily. We therefore count whether the 
country has opted into compulsory jurisdiction by the ICJ in a particular year.14 
The resulting unweighted indicator ranges between zero and one, with higher values 
indicating higher levels of membership. According to the indicator, 18 countries out of 
the 136 countries included in our sample score one in the year 2006, while 7 countries 
show the lowest number of participation in international organizations of 0.06. The 
weighted index is calculated by dividing the number of years a country is member in 
the respective organization by the maximum number of years membership is possible. 
The individual organizations receive again equal weight in the overall index. The 
resulting weighted index takes values between zero and 0.94, where higher values again 
represent higher levels of membership. According to the weighted index, Fiji, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Papua New Guinea, and Mozambique have delegated least 
competence internationally in the year 2006, whereas Norway, Sweden, Denmark, 
Finland, and Italy come in first. The appendix reports descriptive statistics. 
4 Data and Estimation Approach 
The purpose of this paper is to make first steps in answering the question whether the 
international delegation of competence reduces the credibility problems of 
governments. In the previous section, two possible proxies for the degree of 
international delegation have been discussed. We now turn to the choice of our 
dependent variable, namely the degree of credibility that is conjectured to be influenced 
by the degree to which governments have delegated competence internationally. 
To proxy for “credibility” we suggest creditworthiness scores as assigned by various 
risk firms. This subjective indicator has the advantage of implicitly controlling for a 
number of factors that might influence a country’s capacity to repay a large debt but 
that would be very difficult to control for using objective controls (Keefer and Knack 
2003).15 As our main indicator, we use the country risk ratings produced by Euromoney 
                                                 
14  This variable is only included in the unweighted version of the indicator. Countries accepting ICJ 
jurisdiction with reservations were coded .5. Additionally, it would, of course, be interesting to take into 
account to what degree various countries factually implement ICJ dicta. But over the course of its 
existence, the ICJ has only pronounced some 100 decisions, which does not seem to be a sufficiently 
large base for that type of information. 
15  With regard to creditworthiness ratings, Keefer and Knack (2003, 173) cite a study by Feder and 
Ross (1982) who show that out of a sample of 78 Euromarket loans for 34 countries, the interest rate   16
on an annual basis. The choice of the country risk ratings as a proxy for a country’s 
credibility is based on the assumption that good scores on risk ratings imply that a 
government’s announcement to pay back loans as agreed upon is evaluated as credible. 
It is, hence, assumed that a country enjoys only one level of credibility. This is certainly 
a simplifying assumption, as it could be the case that a government always services its 
own debt on time (which would result in a high level of credibility) whereas it 
constantly attenuates the property rights of foreign direct investors. Yet, in order to 
keep things simple, we have decided to assume one uniform level of credibility for each 
country at a particular point in time. 
Euromoney’s risk ratings are based on the view of experts, heads of syndication and 
loans, as well as data from the World Bank, forfaiting houses and credit rating 
agencies. They are available since 1982.16 To obtain the overall country risk score, 
Euromoney assigns a weighting to nine categories. These are political risk (25% 
weighting), economic performance (25%), debt indicators (10%), debt in default or 
rescheduled (10%), credit ratings (10%), access to bank finance (5%), access to short-
term finance (5%), access to capital markets (5%), and discount on forfaiting (5%). The 
resulting index ranges between zero and 100, with higher values representing higher 
credibility.17 
Our regressions are pooled time-series cross-section analyses (panel data) and cover the 
period 1982-2004. Fixed country and time effects are significant at the one percent 
level in all estimated model specifications; they are included in all regressions but not 
shown in the tables. Since some of the data are not available for all countries or years, 
the panel data are unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of 
explanatory variables. We include two lags of the dependent variable, which turned out 
to be highly significant according to most specifications.18 
                                                                                                                                              
spread was strongly and inversely correlated with the creditworthiness ratings, controlling for maturity 
and length of the grace period. They also cite a study published by the General Accounting Office of the 
U.S. in 1994 that found the creditworthiness indicator to be similarly strongly related to the discount on 
38 sovereign debt instruments, owed by 21 countries, which were traded on secondary markets.   
Arguably, objective indicators such as the variance in interest rates among countries or the level of 
investment measured either as total private investment or as foreign direct investment could also be used 
as proxies for credibility. While focusing on subjective indicators here, we plan to pursue this in future 
research. 
16 Since 1993, the ratings are provided on a semi-annual basis. We used the September version. 
17 Arguably, some components in this rating seem to determine country risk rather than being part of it. 
Good economic performance should, e.g., lead to an improvement in the risk rating whereas large 
outstanding debt should lead to its deterioration. We test for the stability of our results using an index 
excluding these components below. 
18 Further lags of the dependent variable are not significant at conventional levels. The choice of lag 
structure does not affect our key results.   17
The basic equation takes the following form: 
it t i it it it it X IO y y y ε λ η β β β β α + + + + + + + = − − −
'
4 1 3 2 2 1 1 , (1) 
where yit represents country risk in country i at year t, and IOit-1 is the respective 
(lagged) measure of membership in international organizations. X is the vector of 
control variables, ηi and λt represent country and, respectively, year fixed effects, 
while it ε  represents the disturbance.  
In choosing our control variables, we follow Cosset and Roy (1991), showing that 
country risk decreases significantly with higher GDP per capita. Consequently, we 
include per capita GDP as control variable. The data used are in constant 2000 US$ in 
logarithmic form, taken from the World Bank’s (2007) World Development Indicators. 
Appendix A shows the exact definitions of all variables with their sources, while 
Appendix B reports descriptive statistics. 
With regard to economic variables, we additionally control for a country’s openness, 
measured as the sum of exports plus imports normalized by GDP. This is based on the 
conjecture that higher degrees of openness are likely to be correlated with better risk 
ratings and membership in international organizations. Regarding political variables, 
we control for institutional quality employing the index of law and order from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of the PRS Group. The law and order index 
assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system as well as the popular 
observance of the law. It ranges from zero to six, where a higher number indicates a 
better system of law and order. This index is available over the period 1984-2004. 
Arguably, the degree of institutional quality is likely to reduce country risk.  
As pointed out in the theoretical section, we want to deal with the question whether the 
effects of membership in international organizations – if there are, indeed, any – are a 
substitute for adequate domestic institutions or whether they complement them. We 
therefore interact membership in international organizations with our measure of 
domestic institutional quality: 
it t i it it
it it it it it
X Quality IO
Quality IO y y y
ε λ η β β
β β β β α
+ + + +





4 1 3 2 2 1 1
*
 (2) 
where Qualityit represents our measure of institutional quality. 
As one problem, we have to deal with the potential endogeneity of country risk. It 
cannot be excluded that income or even credibility determines a country’s prospects for 
joining IOs as already mentioned above. We pursue two strategies to deal with these 
selection problems. First, we test for the exogeneity of membership in (selected) 
international organizations using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. We employ (log)   18
population size and the number of embassies located in a country as instrumental 
variables. Small countries depend more than large countries on being internationally 
integrated on various grounds: they are more likely to depend on imported goods, they 
are less likely to create and maintain a military defence of their own etc. The number of 
embassies located in a country have been suggested in Dreher, Gaston and Martens 
(2008) as proxy for political integration and are thus likely to affect membership in 
international organizations also (but are unlikely to affect country risk). 
According to the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, the null hypothesis that 
membership in international organizations is exogenous can not be rejected at 
conventional levels of significance independent of the choice of indicator for 
membership. 
As our second approach to deal with the potential endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables, we employ the system GMM estimator as suggested by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The dynamic panel 
GMM estimator exploits an assumption about the initial conditions to obtain moment 
conditions that remain informative even for persistent data. Results are based on the 
two-step estimator implemented by Roodman (2005) in Stata, including Windmeijer’s 
(2005) finite sample correction. We apply the Sargan-Hansen test on the validity of the 
instruments used (amounting to a test for the exogeneity of the covariates) and the 
Arellano-Bond test of second order autocorrelation, which must be absent from the data 
in order for the estimator to be consistent. We treat GDP per capita as predetermined 
and all other variables as endogenous. As before, we include time dummies in the 
regression. In order to minimize the number of instruments in the regressions we 
collapse the matrix of instruments as suggested in Roodman (2006). To anticipate the 
results, the Sargan-Hansen test and the Arellano-Bond test do not reject these 
specifications at conventional levels of significance.  
The next section presents the results. 
5 Results 
Table 1 shows the results for the basic setup. Column 1 includes the overall indicator of 
membership in international organizations. Column 2 focuses on the unweighted 
indicator of membership in selected organizations as described above, while column 3 
includes the weighted version instead. Columns 4-6 replicate the analysis employing 
the GMM estimator.    19
As can be seen, country risk decreases with higher per capita GDP according to five of 
the six regressions, at least at the five percent level of significance.19 The index of law 
and order is highly significant according to all specifications, with the expected positive 
coefficient, and the same is true regarding the first lag of the dependent variable. The 
second lag of the dependent variable also enters with a positive coefficient and is 
significant at the ten percent level at least according to five of the six specifications. 
Openness to trade, to the contrary, is completely insignificant in all regressions. The 
estimated coefficients show that an increase in per capita GDP by ten percent reduces 
country risk by between 0.16 – 0.39 points, while an improvement in the law and order 
index by one point reduces country risk by between 0.42 – 0.97 points. 
Turning to our variables of interest – membership in international organizations – the 
OLS results show that the simple membership count is significant at the ten percent 
level, while the weighted and unweighted indicators are significant at the five percent 
level, all with the expected positive coefficient. This suggests that membership in 
international organizations indeed reduces country risk, independent of how the 
variable is constructed. However, when replicating the analysis employing the GMM 
estimator, the unweighted indicator loses its significance (while the other two indicators 
stay significant at the ten percent level at least). The weighted and unweighted 
indicators are constructed in a very similar fashion except for the number of years that a 
country has been member to an international organization which is only taken into 
account in the weighted version. This seems to indicate that time might indeed have an 
important impact on the level of credibility attributed to a country. 
According to the OLS estimates of column 1, membership in one additional 
international organization reduces country risk by about 0.05. The GMM estimates 
reported in column 3 show a somewhat higher marginal effect of 0.09. An increase in 
the weighted (unweighted) index of membership in selected organizations by 0.1 
reduces risk by 0.98 (0.3) according to the OLS estimates and 0.44 (0.19) when 
estimated with GMM. Arguably, these are small but non-negligable effects, amounting 
to an elasticity of 0.04, 0.04, and 0.08 percent (columns 1, 2, and 3, respectively). 
Comparing the results of the GMM and OLS specifications shows that the coefficients 
of the lagged dependent variables are of similar magnitude, suggesting that the bias 
described by Nickell (1981) is not important here and that the results of the within-
groups specification are valid. Given the similarity of the OLS and GMM results and 
the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test reported above, we conclude that 
                                                 
19 We also included the square of GDP per capita to test for potential non-linearity. The squared 
term is not significant at conventional levels while our main results are not affected.   20
endogeneity is no an issue here and the more efficient OLS results can be taken at face 
value. 
Table 2 investigates the question whether membership in international organizations is 
complementary to adequate domestic institutions or whether membership can serve as a 
substitute. As can be seen, membership in international organizations and the weighted 
indicator for membership in selected organizations remain significant at the one and, 
respectively, five percent level, while the unweighted indicator is marginally 
insignificant. Turning to the interaction terms, the results show a negative coefficient 
for the simple membership indicator, at the one percent level of significance. At the ten 
percent level of significance, the same is true for weighted membership in international 
organizations, while the interaction between law and order and the unweighted 
indicator is not significant at conventional levels. Calculating the marginal effect of 
membership at the minimum value of the law and order index of 0.83 among our 
sample, shows that membership in one additional organization reduces country risk by 
0.09 points, significant at the one percent level. At the maximum value of 12, 
membership in one additional organization decreases country risk by 0.007, but the 
effect is not significant at conventional levels. The marginal effect is further illustrated 
in Graph 1. As can be seen, the marginal effect is significant at the ten percent level for 
low values of the law and order index, but not for high ones. Replicating the analysis 
for membership in selected organizations shows that at the minimum value of the law 
and order index an increase in the unweighted membership index by 0.1 reduces risk by 
0.22, while at the maximum, it reduces risk by 0.26. Note, however, that both effects 
are marginally insignificant, as also illustrated by Graph 2. At the sample mean, the 
effect of weighted membership in specific organizations is significant at the ten percent 
level, indicating that an increase in membership by 0.1 reduces risk by 0.25. The 
corresponding values at the minimum and maximum of law and order for the weighted 
indicator are 1.2 and, respectively, 0.6. While the effect of membership is significant at 
the five percent level at the minimum, it is not significant at the maximum (see Graph 
3). 
It is now interesting to ask whether membership in different IOs has differential 
impacts on countries’ risk ratings. Table 3 contains the answer to this question. In 
addition to GDP per capita, law and order, and trade, we add – one at the time – one of 
our variables for time-weighted membership in the eight individual organizations (and 
unweighted acceptance of ICJ legislation) to the regressions. As can be seen, 
membership in the GATT/WTO, membership in the International Center for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and ratification of the Optional Protocol 
significantly reduce country risk. When included jointly, however, only GATT/WTO 
membership and membership in the ICSID remain significant at the ten percent level at   21
least. These results are in line with intuition as both institutions seem to enhance the 
protection of property rights.20 
To summarize, we find that membership in international organizations reduces country 
risk. In countries with low institutional quality – as measured by low scores on the law 
and order index – this effect is particularly pronounced, and highly significant, while 
the impact is smaller and not significant in countries scoring high on the law and order 
index. Our results suggest that countries with low credibility provided by their own 
institutional quality can “buy” credibility by becoming members in international 
organizations. The next section tests for the robustness of our results. 
6 Further Discussion and Tests for Robustness 
This section tests for the robustness of our results. First, we employ Institutional 
Investor’s country risk scores as alternative dependent variable.21 The ratings are based 
on a survey of leading international banks who are asked to rate each country on a scale 
from zero to 100 (with higher values representing more creditworthiness). Institutional 
Investor averages these ratings, providing greater weights to respondents with higher 
worldwide exposure and more sophisticated country analysis systems.22 
Second, OECD countries are arguably less likely to rely on international organizations 
to provide credibility. In order to make sure that the results are not driven by the 
wealthy states who enjoy high credibility and are members in many IOs, we rerun the 
regressions excluding OECD member states. 
Third, some of the components included in Euromoney’s risk ratings seem to determine 
country risk rather than being part of it. Good economic performance should, e.g., lead 
to an improvement in the risk rating whereas large outstanding debt should lead to its 
deterioration. We pursue two strategies to deal with this. We use a modified version of 
the indicator using three components that are clearly parts rather than determinants of 
risk: (i) Political risk, which comprises the risk of non-payment or non-servicing of 
payment for goods or services, loans, trade-related finance and dividends, and the non-
repatriation of capital that is evaluated by the risk analysts. It thus reflects the perceived 
                                                 
20   Note that we can not include the unweighted membership dummies as in many cases countries 
became member before the start of our sample period and the analysis includes fixed country effects. 
21 We thank Carmen Reinhart for providing these data (as used in Reinhart et al., 2003).  
22 Country risk ratings typically reflect the views of outsiders to a country. Yet, if membership in IOs 
increases the commitment capacity of governments, this should also be reflected in the domestic 
perception of the security of property rights. We therefore chose the indicator “property rights” as 
provided in the Index of Economic Freedom (Kane et al. 2007) as an alternative dependent variable. The 
indicator can take on values between 1 (best) and 5 (worst) and is available for more than 150 countries. 
However, none of the membership indicators are significant at conventional levels.   22
probability of governments breaking some of their promises; (ii) the credit ratings 
assigned to sovereign ratings from Moody's, S&P and Fitch IBCA, and (iii) the 
discount on forfaiting reflecting the average maximum tenor for forfaiting and the 
average spread over riskless countries such as the US. Unfortunately, the detailed 
categories are available since 1992 only, so we lose almost ten years of observations. 
As our alternative strategy to control for the influence of potential determinants of 
country risk, we include variables to control for these determinants among our set of 
explanatory variables. Specifically, we employ (i) the ratio of debt service to exports, 
(ii) state consumption to GNP, and (iii) GDP per capita growth, all taken from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2007). Arguably, higher values of debt 
service and state consumption and lower growth rates should reduce the 
creditworthiness of a country, ceteris paribus. 
Additionally, we control for potential political determinants of country risk likely to be 
correlated with membership in international organizations. We employ the following 
variables: (i) the number of veto players within the country. We are interested in the 
additional commitment capacity that a country can gain from becoming member in a 
number of international organizations beyond the commitment capacity that is founded 
on the separation of powers domestically. The variable is included based on the 
assumption that a higher number of domestic veto players could confer higher levels of 
credibility onto the respective governments. The variable is the CHECKS-variable from 
the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2000). (ii) indicators for external and, 
respectively, internal conflict provided by the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG). Conflict is measured on a scale of 1 – 12, where higher values imply less risk 
of conflict. The indicators measure the perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional 
and/or violent means. High degrees of (perceived) political instability could lead to low 
risk ratings which is why we control for them. (iii) We use the democracy/autocracy 
variable as published in Polity IV (taken from Marshall and  Jaggers 2004) to control 
for the possibility that the degree of realized democracy has an impact on the credibility 
of a regime, while at the same time being correlated with membership in international 
organizations.23  
As our final test for robustness we employ two alternative indicators of institutional 
quality. First, we use the political rights index provided by Freedom House (2007). The 
index ranges from 1 to 7, where higher values reflect less liberty. Our second 
                                                 
23 According to Aidt and Gassebner (2007), e.g., the political system has long lasting effects on 
trade relations.   23
alternative is the overall ICRG institutional quality index. ICRG employs a blend of 
quantitative and qualitative measures to calculate their composite index, using five 
financial, thirteen political and six economic factors. Each factor is assigned a 
numerical rating within a specified range, where higher scores represent lower risk. 
Arguably, while the overall ICRG index is frequently used as a measure of institutional 
quality (e.g., Chong and Calderón 2000), it to some extent also reflects country risk as 
measured by our dependent variable. While thus not being the perfect measure of 
institutional quality for our purposes, we still use it to test for robustness. 
Columns 1 – 3 of Table 4 report the results with the alternative dependent variable – the 
credit rating provided by Institutional Investor – while columns 4 – 6 show the results 
when OECD countries are excluded (again using the original dependent variable). The 
results show that the simple membership indicator is not significant at conventional 
levels, while membership in selected organizations reduces risk at the ten percent level 
at least. Comparing the coefficients of columns 5 and 6 with those reported in columns 
2 and 3 of Table 1 shows, interestingly, a substantial increase when excluding OECD 
countries. Specifically, an increase in the membership index by 0.1 reduces country risk 
by 0.36 according to the unweighted indicator and, respectively, 1.5 according to the 
weighted one. This suggests that membership in international organizations is more 
important for non-OECD countries.  
Columns 7 – 8 report the results with the modified Euromoney ratings as dependent 
variable. According to the results, none of our proxies for delegation affects risk at 
conventional levels of significance. In order to test whether this result is due to the 
change in the dependent variable or, alternatively, the substantially reduced period 
under observation, we replicated the analysis employing the original index for the same 
reduced period of time. The results employing the original index are almost identical, 
suggesting that the shorter period of time is responsible for the insignificant 
coefficients. In fact, correlation between the original and the modified index is very 
high (0.97), suggesting that the previous results are not affected by the inclusion of 
components likely to determine rather than measure risk. 
What happens if the additional variables are taken into account? This is done in Table 
5. While columns 1 – 3 only include the economic variables included to control for 
economic determinants of risk covered by the dependant variable, columns 4 – 6 also 
include the additional political variables. As expected, higher debt service increases 
country risk whereas higher growth improves it according to all specifications, at least 
at the ten percent level of significance. To the contrary, and unexpectedly, country risk 
decreases significantly with higher government consumption. The degree of checks and 
balances is also significant at the ten percent level at least, showing that checks and   24
balances increase country risk, surprisingly. Throughout, the absence of internal 
conflict significantly decreases risk, while external conflict and democracy are never 
significant at conventional levels. Note that openness to trade is now significant at the 
five percent level at least, with a negative coefficient. It thus seems that openness 
increases risk rather then decreasing it.24 Most importantly, however, membership in 
selected international organizations is again significant at the ten percent level at least 
for the unweighted version and, respectively, the one percent level for the weighted 
indicator, showing that the previous results are not affected by the omission of 
potentially relevant variables. 
Table 6 turns to describing the results using political rights and, respectively, political 
risk as alternative indicators of institutional quality. As it turns out, the political rights 
index and its interaction with the respective membership indicator are completely 
insignificant according to all regressions (column 1 – 3), while membership in 
international organizations is significantly positive independent of the indicator used, at 
least at the ten percent level. Using the ICRG index of institutional quality instead 
shows a different picture. According to the three specifications reported in columns 4 – 
6, better institutional quality reduces country risk, at the one percent level of 
significance. However, in only one specification, the membership indicator and its 
interaction with institutional quality are also significant at conventional levels. This is 
true for membership in all international organizations, where membership itself again 
reduces risk, and the interaction increases risk. According to column 4, membership in 
an additional organization reduces risk by 0.1 points (at the one percent level of 
significance) at the minimum level of political risk among our sample (22) and is not 
significant at conventional levels at the maximum. 
To summarize, there is strong evidence that membership in international organizations 
reduces country risk. There is also evidence that credibility provided by international 
organizations substitutes for domestic credibility. However, while the first result is 
quite robust, the latter depends on how institutional quality is measured. 
7 Conclusion and Outlook 
We have constructed three variables indicating the degree to which countries are 
members in IOs. Membership is interpreted as a partial delegation of decision-making 
competence to the international level and an attempt to make policy announcements 
more credible. Using panel data for up to 136 countries and the period from 1984 to 
                                                 
24 This result is in line with Rodrik (1998), arguing globalization to increase individuals’ risk of being 
unemployed.   25
2004, our results show that higher degrees of membership in international organizations 
are robustly correlated with lower country risk ratings. Two additional results stand out: 
(1) length of membership matters; the longer a country has been a member of an IO, the 
better its risk rating, ceteris paribus. (2) Membership in IOs is particularly important 
for a country’s credibility when domestic institutions are weak. This is shown by two 
different approaches: (i) the coefficients for the membership variables are particularly 
high when OECD member countries have been excluded from the panel and (ii) the 
interaction of proxies for domestic institutional quality with domestic institutional 
quality increases risk. Up to a degree, credibility can, hence, not only be “made” but 
also be “bought.” 
Nevertheless, this paper can only be the first step in estimating the credibility-
enhancing effects of IO membership. It would, e.g., be interesting to estimate the costs 
of exiting IOs explicitly. On a more fundamental level, the sanctioning machinery of 
IOs deserves more explicit analysis: how does it work, how has the right to use it been 
applied, who has incentives to do so etc. 
The main goal of this paper has been to lay the foundations for estimating the effects of 
an international delegation of power for the credibility of national governments. It is 
important to keep in mind that this is by no means the only function of IOs. If one is 
interested in their effects on internalizing border-crossing externalities, in encouraging 
cooperation and the like, other approaches are thus needed. 
Other aspects that need to be dealt with in future work include the endogenization of 
the delegation decisions. Under what circumstances – one would ask – are politicians 
particularly prone to delegate powers internationally? How can we explain that 
competences in some areas (like monetary policy) are more likely to be delegated than 
policy competences in other areas? 
This leads directly to the next question, namely the normative issue: how much 
competence should be delegated? Will too much delegation lead to a hollowing out of 
democracy,25 will it lead to lower degrees of legitimacy etc. What policy-areas should 
optimally be delegated to domestic agencies and what areas to international agencies? 
                                                 
25 See Frey and Stutzer (2006) for an interesting approach to address the democratic deficit of 
international organizations.   26
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    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Membership in IOs (t-1)  0.046      0.089     
  (1.70)*     (2.14)**    
Membership in selected IOs,    2.804      1.902   
    unweighted (t-1)    (2.18)**      (0.91)   
Membership in selected IOs,      9.766      4.349 
    weighted (t-1)     (2.34)**     (1.71)* 
(log)  GDP  per  capita  1.574 2.463 2.403 1.967  3.870 3.443 
 (0.93)  (2.01)**  (1.98)**  (2.24)** (4.87)*** (4.75)*** 
Law  and  order,  index  0.476 0.415 0.440 0.969  0.796 0.893 
  (3.97)*** (4.31)*** (4.55)*** (2.87)*** (3.19)***  (3.77)*** 
Trade (% of GDP)  -0.017  -0.013  -0.011  -0.005  0.004  0.009 
  (1.34) (1.32) (1.14) (0.40)  (0.25) (0.58) 
Dependent  variable  (t-1)  0.586 0.564 0.561 0.644  0.558 0.568 
 (17.92)*** (20.43)*** (20.37)*** (10.66)*** (11.05)*** (11.63)***
Dependent  variable  (t-2)  0.029 0.047 0.045 0.095  0.060 0.062 
 (0.93)  (1.77)*  (1.72)*  (2.16)** (1.69)*  (1.74)* 
Constant 3.897  -2.013  -3.788  -12.674  -17.495  -16.608 
  (0.31) (0.22) (0.41)  (2.86)*** (4.36)***  (4.89)*** 
Method  OLS OLS OLS  GMM  GMM  GMM 
Observations  1647 2061 2061 1647 2061 2061 
Number  of  countries  104 118 118 104 118 118 
Number of instruments        99  102  102 
R-squared  (within)  0.56 0.56 0.56       
Arellano-Bond-Test  (p-level)      0.11  0.74  0.77 
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-level)           0.11  0.11  0.10 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is Euromoney’s risk rating. The OLS regressions include fixed 
country and year dummies; GMM includes year dummies. 
(robust, absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** 
significant at 1% level. 
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Table 2: International Organizations – Substitutes or Complements (OLS, 1984-2004) 
    (1) (2) (3) 
Membership in IOs (t-1)  0.093     
 (2.73)***     
Membership in selected IOs,    2.255   
    unweighted (t-1)    (1.41)   
Membership in selected IOs,      12.752 
    weighted (t-1)      (2.47)** 
Law and order  0.798  0.402  0.607 
  (4.66)*** (3.09)*** (4.27)*** 
IOs * Law and order  -0.007     
 (2.76)***     
Selected IOs * Law and order    0.027   
    (unweighted)    (0.17)   
Selected IOs * Law and order      -0.579 
    (weighted)      (1.94)* 
(log) GDP per capita  2.342  2.135  2.481 
 (1.07)  (1.69)*  (1.92)* 
Trade (% of GDP)  -0.018  -0.014  -0.014 
  (1.24) (1.38) (1.40) 
Dependent variable (t-1)  0.543  0.545  0.544 
 (15.91)*** (20.63)*** (20.72)*** 
Dependent variable (t-2)  0.058  0.059  0.057 
 (1.66)*  (2.30)**  (2.23)** 
Constant -5.348  2.979  -3.145 
  (0.33) (0.31) (0.30) 
Observations  1422 1997 1997 
Number of countries  104  118  118 
R-squared  (within)  0.55 0.57 0.57 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is Euromoney’s risk rating. All regressions include fixed 
country and year dummies. 
(robust, absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** 
significant at 1% level. Table 3: Membership in selected IOs and Country Risk (OLS, 1984-2004) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
GATT/WTO  (weighted)  15.556          17.680 
  (3.85)***          (3.38)*** 
ICSID  (weighted)   5.878         5.585 
   (2.28)**         (1.74)* 
IFC  (weighted)    5.617        2.545 
    (1.53)        (0.47) 
ICCPR  (weighted)     2.002       -0.261 
     (0.70)       (0.05) 
ICESCR  (weighted)      2.619      0.141 
      (0.99)      (0.03) 
Optional  Protocol  (weighted)       4.024     0.217 
       (1.93)*     (0.08) 
New  York  Convention  (weighted)        -1.374    0.863 
        (0.41)    (0.22) 
Folter  Convention  (weighted)         0.365   0.798 
         (0.39)   (0.74) 
ICJ  (unweighted)          -0.482  -0.438 
          (0.34)  (0.30) 
Law  and  order  0.399 0.436 0.433 0.421 0.418 0.438 0.419 0.426 0.405 0.433 
  (4.16)*** (4.50)*** (4.50)*** (4.38)*** (4.33)*** (4.52)*** (4.32)*** (4.41)*** (3.52)*** (3.72)*** 
(log)  GDP  per  capita  2.812 2.212 2.264 2.396 2.447 2.411 2.297 2.196 3.731 4.354 
  (2.33)**  (1.83)* (1.86)* (1.96)*  (2.01)** (2.00)** (1.89)* (1.81)* (2.65)***  (3.11)*** 
Trade (% of GDP)  -0.016  -0.013  -0.013  -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.026 -0.031 
  (1.57) (1.31) (1.31) (1.21) (1.20) (1.31) (1.21) (1.15) (2.15)**  (2.59)*** 
Dependent  variable  (t-1)  0.556 0.561 0.565 0.564 0.563 0.561 0.565 0.565 0.552 0.535   33
 (20.03)*** (20.48)*** (20.46)*** (20.32)***  (20.26)*** (20.31)*** (20.40)*** (20.46)*** (17.67)*** (17.00)*** 
Dependent  variable  (t-2)  0.041 0.042 0.049 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.043 0.031 
  (1.56) (1.61) (1.84)*  (1.75)* (1.73)* (1.75)* (1.76)* (1.77)* (1.49)  (1.08) 
Constant  -10.022  -1.004 -3.372 -0.815 -1.400 -0.777 1.055  1.204  -8.770 -28.248 
  (1.07) (0.11) (0.35) (0.09) (0.15) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.82) (2.31)** 
Observations  2061 2061 2061 2061 2061 2061 2061 2061 1630 1630 
Number  of  group(code)  118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 100 100 
R-squared  0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.56 
 
Notes: All regressions include fixed country and year dummies. 
(robust, absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.   34
Table 4: Membership in IOs and Country Risk, test for robustness I 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
   Institutional Investor  Euromoney, without OECD  Euromoney, modified index 
Membership  in  IOs  (t-1)  0.008    0.031    0.002    
  (0.85)    (0.72)    (0.18)    
Membership  in  selected  IOs,   0.905    3.582    0.588  
    unweighted (t-1)    (1.84)*      (2.27)**      (0.70)   
Membership  in  selected  IOs,     4.906     15.178     4.975 
    weighted (t-1)      (3.02)***    (2.76)***     (1.46) 
Law  and  order  0.186 0.141 0.154 0.422 0.455 0.453 8.036 7.464 7.438 
  (3.43)*** (3.20)*** (3.48)*** (3.04)*** (4.11)*** (4.09)*** (6.29)*** (6.90)*** (6.87)*** 
(log)  GDP  per  capita  2.623 2.316 2.415 1.676 2.858 3.158 0.267 0.240 0.247 
  (3.00)*** (3.61)*** (3.82)***  (0.90)  (2.03)** (2.22)**  (3.89)*** (3.80)*** (3.85)*** 
Trade  (%  of  GDP)  -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.029 -0.024 -0.020 -0.018 -0.016 -0.017 
  (0.55) (0.83) (0.65)  (1.90)*  (2.12)** (1.74)* (2.37)**  (2.46)**  (2.50)** 
Dependent  variable  (t-1)  1.370 1.373 1.365 0.599 0.550 0.544 0.522 0.502 0.500 
 (27.80)*** (30.52)*** (30.37)*** (14.39)***  (15.99)*** (15.84)*** (11.69)*** (12.18)*** (12.18)*** 
Dependent  variable  (t-2)  -0.522  -0.512  -0.508 0.063 0.090 0.089 0.008 0.023 0.019 
 (10.50)*** (11.12)*** (11.01)*** (1.61)  (2.82)***  (2.81)***  (0.22) (0.66) (0.53) 
Constant  -17.088 -15.059 -17.737  -1.659  -10.952 -15.831 -55.233 -49.290 -51.138 
 (2.56)**  (3.00)***  (3.56)***  (0.13)  (1.14)  (1.58)  (5.99)*** (6.32)*** (6.52)*** 
Observations  1270 1520 1520 1139 1467 1467 1093 1232 1232 
Number  of  countries  81 83 83 74 88 88  104  118  118 
R-squared  (within)  0.92 0.93 0.93 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.53 0.51 0.51 
 
Notes: All regressions include fixed country and year dummies. 
(robust, absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. Table 5: Membership in IOs and Country Risk, test for robustness II 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Membership  in  IOs  (t-1) 0.027    0.045    
  (0.72)    (1.13)    
Membership  in  selected  IOs,   4.001    3.595  
    unweighted (t-1)    (2.30)**      (1.95)*   
Membership  in  selected  IOs,     18.149    20.734 
    weighted (t-1)     (3.14)***     (3.50)*** 
Law  and  order  0.310 0.292 0.311 0.087 0.122 0.107 
 (2.26)**  (2.66)***  (2.84)***  (0.59) (0.99) (0.87) 
(log)  GDP  per  capita  1.809 2.393 2.803 2.215 2.808 3.437 
 (0.90)  (1.53)  (1.78)*  (1.07) (1.69)*  (2.05)** 
GDP  growth    0.305 0.309 0.297 0.295 0.307 0.291 
  (5.66)*** (6.88)*** (6.69)*** (5.27)*** (6.60)*** (6.37)*** 
Trade  (%  of  GDP)  -0.047 -0.032 -0.028 -0.052 -0.035 -0.032 
 (3.13)***  (2.59)***  (2.32)**  (3.45)*** (2.79)***  (2.56)** 
Debt  service  (%  of  exports) -0.059 -0.043 -0.049 -0.056 -0.043 -0.049 
 (2.70)***  (2.24)**  (2.58)**  (2.35)** (1.96)** (2.27)** 
Gov.  consump.  (%  of  GDP)  0.129 0.125 0.130 0.152 0.153 0.161 
 (1.77)*  (2.05)**  (2.12)**  (2.03)** (2.36)** (2.49)** 
Checks and balances        -0.263  -0.306  -0.292 
      (1.93)*  (2.35)**  (2.29)** 
External conflict, index        0.019  -0.020  0.064 
      (0.11)  (0.15)  (0.49) 
Internal conflict, index        0.525  0.384  0.412 
      (3.48)***  (2.91)***  (3.15)*** 
Democracy,  index      0.049  0.013  0.010 
      (0.62)  (0.19)  (0.15) 
Dependent  variable  (t-1)  0.586 0.545 0.536 0.579 0.543 0.530 
 (14.02)*** (15.79)*** (15.51)*** (13.62)*** (15.25)*** (14.93)***
Dependent  variable  (t-2)  0.111 0.120 0.118 0.110 0.114 0.111 
  (2.95)*** (3.84)*** (3.83)*** (2.93)*** (3.60)*** (3.57)*** 
Constant  -3.599  -8.949 -15.082 -9.162 -12.409  -21.534 
  (0.26) (0.83) (1.37) (0.63) (1.09)  (1.83)* 
Observations  1078 1357 1357 1030 1292 1292 
Number  of  countries  73 87 87 72 86 86 
R-squared  (within)  0.69 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.67 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is Euromoney’s risk rating. All regressions include fixed 
country and year dummies. 
(robust, absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** 
significant at 1% level. 
 Table 6: IOs – Substitutes or Complements, test for robustness 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Membership in IOs (t-1)  0.051      0.091     
  (1.74)*     (2.61)***    
Membership in selected 
IOs,   4.124    -0.363  
    unweighted (t-1)    (2.85)***      (0.20)   
Membership in selected 
IOs,     10.902    10.641 
    weighted (t-1)     (2.65)***     (1.79)* 
Political  rights,  index  0.275 0.153 0.258       
  (1.03) (0.75) (1.21)       
Political  risk,  index      0.337  0.222  0.244 
      (9.68)***  (8.51)***  (8.29)*** 
IOs  *  Political  rights 0.007       
  (1.40)       
Selected IOs * Political 
rights    0.181      
    (weighted)    (0.77)         
Selected IOs * Political 
rights     0.135     
    (unweighted)      (0.27)       
IOs * Political risk        -0.001     
      (1.97)**    
Selected IOs * Political risk          0.048   
    (weighted)          (2.06)**   
Selected  IOs  *  Political  risk        0.018 
    (unweighted)            (0.30) 
(log)  GDP  per  capita  3.786 3.888 3.871 1.390 0.995 1.142 
 (1.99)**  (3.31)***  (3.33)***  (0.71) (0.81) (0.92) 
Trade  (%  of  GDP)  -0.026 -0.011 -0.010 -0.031 -0.022 -0.021 
 (1.89)*  (1.23)  (1.11)  (2.40)** (2.18)** (2.11)** 
Dependent  variable  (t-1)  0.550 0.540 0.539 0.472 0.487 0.486 
 (15.83)*** (20.71)*** (20.73)*** (14.98)*** (18.62)*** (18.63)***
Dependent  variable  (t-2)  0.054 0.061 0.060 0.055 0.048 0.046 
 (1.60)  (2.52)**  (2.46)**  (1.71)* (1.93)* (1.87)* 
Constant  -9.862 -13.684  -14.611 -6.270  -0.077  -6.630 
  (0.71) (1.60)  (1.72)*  (0.43) (0.01) (0.70) 
Observations  1599 2336 2336 1426 2000 2000 
Number  of  countries  113 136 136 104 118 118 
R-squared  (within)  0.54 0.54 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.59 
Notes: The dependent variable is Euromoney’s risk rating. All regressions include fixed 
country and year dummies. 
(robust, absolute) t-statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** 
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Euromoney, index Risk ratings based on expert views, heads of syndication and 
loans, as well as data from the World Bank, forfaiting houses 
and credit rating agencies. Composite of nine categories: 
political risk (25% weighting), economic performance (25%), 
debt indicators (10%), debt in default or rescheduled (10%), 
credit ratings (10%), access to bank finance (5%), access to 
short-term finance (5%), access to capital markets (5%), and 
discount on forfaiting (5%).
Euromoney 
(various years)
Euromoney, modified index Composite of hree components that are clearly parts rather than 
determinants of risk: (i) Political risk, which comprises the risk 
of non-payment or non-servicing of payment for goods or 
services, loans, trade-related finance and dividends, and the non-
repatriation of capital that is evaluated by the risk analysts. It 
thus reflects the perceived probability of governments breaking 
some of their promises; (ii) the credit ratings assigned to 
sovereign ratings from Moody's, S&P and Fitch IBCA, and (iii) 
the discount on forfaiting reflecting the average maximum tenor 
for forfaiting and the average spread over riskless countries 
such as the US. 
Euromoney 
(various years)
Institutional Investor, index Country risk ratings based on a survey of leading international 
banks, providing greater weights to respondents with higher 










Membership in selected IOs, unweighted (t-1) Unweighted indicator of membership in selected international 
organizations.
various sources 
as described in 
the text
Membership in selected IOs, weighted (t-1) Indicator of membership in selected international organizations 
weighted by years of membership.
various sources 
as described in 
the text
Law and order Assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system as 
well as the popular observance of the law. It ranges from zero to 




Political risk Overall ICRG institutional quality index employing five 
financial, thirteen political and six economic factors, where 
higher scores represent lower risk. 
ICRG (various 
years)
Political rights Index of political rights ranging from 1 to 7, where higher 
values reflect less liberty. 
Freedom House 
(2007)
(log) GDP per capita In constant 2000 US$. World Bank 
(2007)
GDP growth  Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based 




Trade (% of GDP) Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product.
World Bank 
(2007)
Debt service (% of exports) Sum of principal repayments and interest actually paid in 
foreign currency, goods, or services on long-term debt, interest 
paid on short-term debt, and repayments (repurchases and 
charges) to the IMF. 
World Bank 
(2007)
Government consumption (% of GDP) General government final consumption expenditure. World Bank 
(2007)  39

























Checks and balances The number of veto players within the country. Beck et al. 
(2000)
External conflict, index Measures perceptions of both of the risk to the incumbent 
government from foreign action, ranging from non-violent 
external pressure (diplomatic pressures, withholding of aid, 
trade restrictions, territorial disputes, sanctions, etc) to violent 
external pressure (cross-border conflicts to all-out war), on a 
scale of 1 – 12, where higher values imply less risk.
ICRG (various 
years)
Internal conflict, index Measures perceptions of political violence in the country and its 
actual or potential impact on governance, on a scale of 1 – 12, 
where higher values imply less risk. The highest rating is given 
to those countries where there is no armed opposition to the 
government and the government does not indulge in arbitrary 
violence, direct or indirect, against its own people. The lowest 
rating is given to a country embroiled in an on-going civil war. 
ICRG (various 
years)
Democracy, index POLITY IV index of democracy. Marshall and 
Jaggers (2004)  40
Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics (estimation sample, Table 1, column 1) 
Variable    Obs   Mean  Std.  Dev.   Min    Max 
                
Euromoney,  index   1647  53.96   25.19    4.00  100.00
Euromoney, modified index    1275   19.06   12.03    0.82   40.00
Institutional Investor, index    1249   46.72   25.37    6.40   95.90
Membership in IOs (t-1)    1647   49.90   13.40    15.00   101.00
Membership in selected IOs, unweighted (t-1)   1647   0.73   0.20    0.00   1.00
Membership in selected IOs, weighted (t-1)    1647   0.48   0.19    0.00   0.94
Law and order    1647   7.66   3.07    0.83   12.00
Political risk    1647   66.32   14.53    23.08   96.08
Political rights    1647   -2.89   1.93    -7.00   -1.00
(log) GDP per capita    1647   7.85   1.56    4.41   10.83
GDP growth     1645   3.28   4.14    -28.10   27.40
Trade (% of GDP)    1647   72.20   42.00    12.85   433.23
Debt service (% of exports)    1087   20   13    0   118
Government consumption (% of GDP)    1639   15.32   5.50    2.90   35.44
Checks and balances    1585   3.34   1.76    1.00   18.00
External conflict, index    1645   10.25   1.84    2.00   12.00
Internal conflict, index    1645   9.12   2.45    0.42   12.00
Democracy, index    1592   4.91   6.05    -9.00   10.00
 
Income 